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Despite years of research, many existing e-voting systems
do not adequately protect voting privacy. In most cases, such
systems only achieve “immediate privacy”, that is, they only
protect voting privacy against today’s adversaries, but not
against a future adversary, who may possess better attack
technologies like new cryptanalysis algorithms and/or quan-
tum computers. Previous attempts at providing long-term
voting privacy (dubbed “everlasting privacy” in the litera-
ture) often require additional trusts in parties that do not
need to be trusted for immediate privacy.
In this paper, we present a framework of adversary mod-
els regarding e-voting systems, and analyze possible threats
to voting privacy under each model. Based on our analysis,
we argue that secret-sharing based voting protocols offer a
more natural and elegant privacy-preserving solution than
their encryption-based counterparts. We thus design and im-
plement Koinonia, a voting system that provides long-term
privacy against powerful adversaries and enables anyone
to verify that each ballot is well-formed and the tallying is
done correctly. Our experiments show thatKoinonia protects
voting privacy with a reasonable performance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Election is the cornerstone of modern democracies; however,
the correct functioning and public trust of election depends
on the equipment/technology used to cast and count bal-
lots. The events surrounding the 2000 United States presi-
dential election and the 2012 election interference by hur-
ricane Sandy demonstrated the shortcomings of conven-
tional voting technology, and amplified the needs to de-
velop more advanced voting technologies. Some countries
have experimented with online voting systems in their elec-
tions [67]. However, due to stringent security and privacy
requirements [21, 39], online voting systems have yet to be
widely deployed.
An e-voting system typically has many Voters, a central
Server, and multiple Authorities who help to ensure voting
privacy even when the Server is malicious. While e-voting
protocols and systems have been extensively studied, we
find that a comprehensive and careful analysis of the ad-
versary model is still lacking. For example, many e-voting
protocols provide voting privacy only against today’s adver-
saries. That is, they use public-key cryptographic primitives
with parameters that are believed to be secure today. We call
this level of privacy “immediate privacy”. However, in the
not-so-distant future, faster computers, better cryptanaly-
sis algorithms and/or the emergence of quantum computers
may compromise the privacy of these votes. In this paper,
we call privacy against such adversaries “long-term privacy”.
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In the literature, “long-term privacy” has been dubbed
“everlasting privacy”. Many attempts at achieving this re-
quire trusting parties that are not trusted for immediate
privacy, resulting in significantly weaker privacy guaran-
tee. For example, Helios [1], perhaps the most prominent
e-voting system, uses threshold cryptography to ensure that
the Server, even if malicious, cannot compromise voter pri-
vacywithout collusion from other Authorities involved in the
voting protocol. However, since Helios publishes encrypted
ballots in a public bulletin, it provides only immediate pri-
vacy. Demirel et al. [33] proposed enhancements that aim at
adding everlasting privacy to Helios. In the new protocol, the
server, instead of publishing encrypted votes in the public
bulletin, publishes cryptographic commitments (which are
information-theoretic hiding) of encrypted votes. We note
that while this provides long-term privacy against an exter-
nal advesary, it does not provide long-term privacy against
the Server, who still sees the ciphertexts and can recover
the plaintext in the future when the encryption scheme can
be broken. Therefore, while no single entity is trusted for
immediate privacy, trust in the Server is necessary for long-
term privacy. The idea for achieving everlasting privacy in
Demirel et al. [33] comes from Moran and Naor [48–50], and
the protocols therein suffer from the same weakness.
More recently, Pino [31] proposed a voting protocol to
deal with potential threats posed by quantum computers.
That protocol builds on [27], which uses cryptographic com-
mitments. In such protocols, privacy is information-theoretic
and is ensured so long as at least one single Authority is hon-
est, and integrity is guaranteed using cryptographic commit-
ment and zero-knowledge proofs, whose security is often
based on hard problems such as discrete logarithm, and can
be brokenwith quantum computers. Pino [31] developed new
commitment and zero-knowledge proof protocols whose se-
curity are based on hard problems involving lattices, so that
integrity can be ensured even when quantum computers
appear, so long as these problems remain hard.
We point out that previous work [31] is inadequate in
dealing with the threats that quantum computers pose to
today’s e-voting. First, quantum computers in the future can-
not retrospectively post threats to the integrity of voting
conducted today, since vote counting and verification are
performed in the present (assuming currently the adversary
does not already have access to quantum computers to break
the integrity). However, quantum computers in the future
post serious threats to the privacy of voting conducted to-
day. This is because the voting transcripts are often made
available to the public to enable verification of integrity and
correctness, but if the voting transcript contains ciphertexts
of votes under encryption schemes that can be broken by
quantum computers, then voting privacy can be compro-
mised in the future. This threat is not addressed by [31].
Second, when dealing with threats of future adversaries,
one has to also consider how the underlying communications
are protected. Most papers on voting protocols make the
standard assumption that communications between honest
parties are private. In practice, however, such communica-
tions are usually protected using standard computationally
secure cryptographic techniques, some of which are based
on the assumptions that certain problems are difficult to
solve. Such assumptions, however, might no longer hold in
the future, possibly in the face of new advancements in al-
gorithm design and quantum computers. This is true even
in the relatively new field of quantum-safe crypto
1
. Some
of the algorithms which are believed to be quantum-safe
today might turn out to be not as secure as expected in the
future. Hence, if one is concerned about future adversaries,
especially when the adversary can monitor all the commu-
nications, then simply encrypting all the networked traffic
might not be sufficient to assure voting privacy.
In order to better understand the threat of future adver-
saries to voting privacy, we propose a framework of adver-
sary models. There are two dimensions. The first is what
computational capabilities the adversary has, alongwhichwe
classify adversaries into current, future, and unbounded.
The second dimension is what the adversary can observe,
along which we classify adversaries into local and global.
(See Section 2 for details.) Composing these two dimensions
gives us a lattice of adversary capabilities. Our analysis sug-
gests that achieving privacy against the strongest adversarial
model, global and unbounded, is extremely difficult, if not im-
possible in practice. However, it is possible to achieve voting
privacy against the twomodels that are slightly weaker in the
lattice, namely, a local, unbounded adversary (who has un-
bounded computational power, but does not conduct global
eavesdropping), and a global, future adversary (who conducts
global eavesdropping, but is unable to break quantum-safe
crypto primitives used by the e-voting system).
Motivated by the principle of “current integrity; future pri-
vacy”, we design and implement an e-voting system dubbed
Koinonia, a Greek word that means “sharing”. The core
Koinonia protocol bears a resemblance to the protocol in [27],
however, we show that even simple additive secret sharing
scheme can be used to satisfy voting privacy needs in our
settings, which makes the solution easier to comprehend
and implement. Additionally, for integrity and correctness
guarantees, each ballot in Koinonia consists of cryptographic
commitments of a voter’s vote shares, as well as proofs that
the shares are well-formed. Koinonia achieves everlasting
(i.e., information theoretic) voting privacy, as long as at least
1
It is believed that quantum computers can only do limited damages to
many of today’s standardized hash and symmetric key algorithms, hence
most of the quantum-safe research focus on public-key crypto, including
the likes of digital signatures and key exchange algorithms.
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one Authority is honest, and the adversary does not see the
cleartext communication between a voter and this honest
Authority (either because the adversary cannot break the en-
cryption used to protect the communication, or when the ad-
versary becomes capable of breaking the encryption scheme,
the communication transcript no longer exists). We have
also enhanced the basic protocol to improve its robustness
against misbehaving entities.
The protocol in Koinonia is computationally efficient; only
a small number of modular exponentiations are needed for
each ballot. Verification of voting integrity can be conducted
by any parties with low computational cost. We have imple-
mented Koinonia and open-sourced the code 2.
The contribution of the paper is as follows:
• We consider the threats of future adversaries to e-voting,
and identify a classification of possible adversaries. Using
this framework, we are able to identify weaknesses of ex-
isting attempts at providing long-term privacy in protocols
such as [33, 48–50].
• Our analysis suggests that a secret-sharing based voting
scheme is more natural and appropriate in handling the
threats of advanced future adversaries, especially in the
face of quantum computers and uncertainties regarding
the security of today’s computationally secure crypto al-
gorithms.
• We design and implement Koinonia, which uses an e-
voting protocol that achieves strong long-term privacy
guarantees, at a reasonably low cost of communication
and computation. Koinonia also allows anyone to verify
the final results.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents our framework of adversaries. Section 3 presents
the high-level ideas used in Koinonia. The Koinonia protocol
specification is given in Section 4, followed by descriptions
of our implementation and performance evaluation results in
Section 5. Related work is discussed in Section 6 and Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 AN FRAMEWORK OF ADVERSARIES
Intuitively, an e-voting protocol should hide how each in-
dividual votes. However, requiring that a voting protocol
leaks no information about how each individual votes is im-
possible to achieve, because the final vote outcome, which
is affected by each individual’s vote, must be public. This
problem becomes more acute when we consider that some
voters may be malicious or corrupted. In the extreme case,
suppose that all voters other than Alice are colluding, then
they can infer how Alice voted from the published vote out-
come and their own votes. Therefore, the best one can hope




⟨дlobal , f uture⟩
⟨дlobal , current⟩
⟨local ,unbounded⟩
⟨local , f uture⟩
⟨local , current⟩
Figure 1: Possible adversary models in terms of
message observation capabilities and computational
power
the aggregate of all votes from honest voters who follow the
protocol. This is formalized by requiring that the adversary
cannot distinguish between two worlds such that the only
differences between them are that honest voters vote dif-
ferently, subject to the constraint that the aggregates of the
honest voters are the same in both worlds.
While e-voting privacy has been studied quite extensively,
one aspect that has not been systematically analyzed is the
capabilities of the adversary. There are two dimensions. The
first is what computational capabilities the adversary has,
alongwhich we identify three classes of adversaries. The cur-
rent adversary is bounded by today’s computational power.
That is, we can assume that today’s widely used public-key
cryptography primitives, which are based on factoring and
discrete log, are secure. The next level-up future adver-
saries may have access to quantum computers and/or better
algorithms for breaking these primitives. Finally, we have
the computationally unbounded adversary, which models
the situation where even today’s quantum-safe crypto algo-
rithms turn out to be broken in the future.
The second dimension is what we assume the adversary
can observe. We categorize this into two levels. A local ad-
versary has access to all views of the parties involved in
the election, except for the honest parties who will follow
the protocol and not share additional information with the
adversary. A global adversary in addition has access to all
(possibly encrypted) communications between all honest
parties as well. Such an adversary is not unrealistic. Some
government agencies aim to monitor and store as much in-
ternet communications as possible. It is also easy to monitor
a small number of targeted users, since most likely the com-
munication channels are wireless. Figure 1 shows the lattice
of adversary models combining computational and commu-
nication access capabilities, ordered by strength.
Ideally, we want to achieve voting privacy against the
strongest possible (namely, ⟨дlobal ,unbounded⟩) adversary;
however, doing so is very difficult, if not impossible in a
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practicable setting. The reason is similar to why a commit-
ment that is both perfect hiding and perfect binding is im-
possible in the normal setting [30]. A global adversary can
observe all traffic from a voter.When the adversary is also un-
bounded, it can also decrypt all communications. (An excep-
tion is when an information-theoretically secure encryption
scheme such as one-time pad is used, which is impractical in
e-voting.) Thus the adversary sees all information sent by a
voter (which can be intended for multiple receivers). In order
for the election to be able to publish a result and produce a
proof of the correctness of the result, it must be possible to
interpret what the voter intends to vote from the combined
information sent by the voter. In that case, an unbounded
adversary should be able to discover what the voter votes as
well.
We aim at achieving voting privacy against slightly weaker
adversaries. First, consider the ⟨дlobal , f uture⟩ adversary,
which is assumed to be able to break number-theory based
public-key crypto, but not quantum-safe crypto. By applying
quantum-safe crypto to protect the communications between
the parties, one renders this adversary equivalent to a local
adversary.
The more interesting case is a ⟨local ,unbounded⟩ adver-
sary. We believe that privacy in this setting is important.
Such an adversary controls some parties in the voting pro-
cess and can see all information made available in the public
channel (such as a public bulletin board) and stores this in-
formation. When in the future quantum computers (or other
ways to break crypto) appear, the adversary can try to find
out retrospectively how the voters voted. There are two com-
mon ways of achieving voter privacy. One approach is to use
encryption, where one’s vote is encrypted, and the cipher-
text is sent to the Server. Either the encryption scheme is
homomorphic and can be decrypted in a threshold setting, or
mixing by multiple authorities is used to break the connec-
tion of an encrypted vote and its voter. The other approach
is to use secret sharing, where one’s vote is split into shares
and sent to a number of authorities. Either way, one has to
trust at least one authority is honest for privacy.
When we want to defend against a ⟨local ,unbounded⟩
adversary, it makes sense to use secret sharing instead of en-
cryption, for protecting voter privacy. In this setting, when
one’s vote is encrypted, then any party who sees the cipher-
text could potentially compromise the privacy in the future
(when crypto is broken). Therefore, instead of trusting at least
one Authority is non-malicious, one effectively must trust all
parties who have access to ciphertexts are non-malicious. On
the other hand, secret sharing schemes can be information
theoretic hiding, which is well suited for protecting privacy
in the face of a ⟨local ,unbounded⟩ adversary. While one can
also secret-share encrypted votes to prevent any single party
from obtaining the full ciphertext, the use of secret sharing
renders encryption unnecessary.
3 OVERVIEW OF KEY IDEAS
In this section, we present the high-level ideas behindKoinonia,
the e-voting software we designed and implemented, start-
ing with the parties involved in secret-sharing-based voting
schemes.
3.1 Sharing-based Voting Schemes
We consider the following parties:
• Election Service Provider (ESP).The ESP runs awebsite
in support of e-voting and provides a Bulletin Board,
which acts as a reliable broadcast channel.
• ElectionAuthority (EA). Each election has one EA,which
is in charge of maintaining a list of registered voters and
publishing information specific to that election.
• Tabulation Tellers. There are t > 1 tallying tellers, or
tellers,T 1,T 2, · · · ,T t . They are involved in the voting and
tallying process. Voting privacy relies on the assumption
that at least one teller is honest and follows the protocol.
(A teller here is equivalent to what was referred to as
Authority in Section 1.)
• Voters. There are n > 1 voters, denoted as Vi where 1 ≤
i ≤ n. We overloadVi to also denote the id of the i’th voter.
We use subscript for voters and superscript for tellers.
ESP provides the software and platform for e-voting. One
ESP may be used to support many elections, each of which
may have its own EA.
In Koinonia, each vote is a vector of non-negative inte-
gers vi =
〈
vi,1,vi,2, . . . ,vi,c
〉
, where c is determined by the
election, e.g., the number of candidates in the election. In
most elections, each vi, j is one bit encoding a yes/no an-
swer for one question; for example, whether to support a
candidate for a position. Oftentimes, in an election, not all
integer vectors are valid selections. For example, there may
be three candidates, and each voter can vote for only one
candidate. We use the predicate valid to denote the condition
for valid votes; that is, valid(vi ) = ⊤ if and only if vi is a
valid selection vector for the election.
A voting scheme is specified by the follow-
ing algorithms (Setup,Vote,Verifyβ ,Verifyρ ,Verifyr,
Aggregate, TallyVerify). The three verification algorithms
Verifyβ ,Verifyρ ,Verifyr all output either ⊤ (indicating
success) or ⊥ (or failure). An election involves the following
interactions:
• ESP runs an algorithm Setup(λ), which on input a security
parameter λ outputs public system parameters Γ (including
q which is a large prime number). Γ is then published.
• EA publishes election information E, which specifies the
voting options such as the positions (e.g., president and
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secretary) and candidates per position, the list of tabulation
tellers (their online addresses and public keys), as well as
a list of voter ids that are legitimate voters.
Γ and E are implicit inputs to all algorithms below.
• Voter Vi , who wants to cast a vote vi , runs an algorithm











The voter sends βi , whichwe call the ballot, to ESP. Ballots
contain auxiliary commitments of the vote used to achieve
correctness and robustness guarantees. VoterVi also sends
each ρki (which we call a vote share) to the teller T
k
.




on each received ρki , and





• ESP runs Verifyβ on each received ballot βi , and accepts
βi if and only if Verifyβ (βi ) = ⊤.
• ESP publishes and signs all accepted ballots, which we use
B to denote.
• Let Rk denote all ballot shares received by the k’th teller
T k . Each T k runs Aggregate(B,Rk ), which outputs rk . T k
sends rk to the ESP.
• On each rk , ESP runs Verifyr(B, r
k ) and accepts it if it is
valid. After ESP has accepted rk ’s from all tellers, ESP
publishes
〈
r1, r2, · · · , rt
〉
.




r1, r2, · · · , rt
〉)
, which
outputs either the vote outcome, which is a vector ∈ Nc
or ⊥, which denotes that the voting transcript is invalid.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, in voting schemes following the
above convention, the interactions between the voters and
the other entities, and between the tellers and the ESP are
minimal. Each voter, after having the election information,
computes the ballot and ballot shares without any interac-
tion with the ESP or the tellers, and then sends these out.
Each teller also computes the aggregates without interacting
with the ESP and only sends the ESP results in the end. This
enables proving voting privacy against the malicious adver-
sary (instead of the honest-but-curious adversary), since the
lack of interaction makes the two models equivalent in our
setting. Anything a malicious adversary can hope to learn
has to come from the messages computed by the honest
parties without being interfered by the malicious parties.
3.2 Using Secret Sharing
In [27], Shamir’s secret sharing is used for voting. Here we
replace it with simple additive sharing, which serves our
purpose. For simplicity, we consider a single election where
each voter Vi ’s vote is a single bit vi ∈ {0, 1}, and the final
election outcome is computed by
∑n
i=1vi .
When voting, each voterVi splits her vote vi into t shares
by first choosing x1i ,x
2
i , · · · ,x
t−1
i uniformly at random from





















Figure 2: A high-level view of voting schemes based
on secret sharing. Dashed lines show actions that en-
tities can take without interacting with others; Solid
lines show messages sent between entities. After the
initial election setup, such schemes typically require
only minimal interactions between entities for vote
casting and tallying.
Vi then sends x
k




Each teller T k receives a number of shares from voters.





i mod q. The final outcome is
t∑
k=1














Any party can do a modulo-q sum of these numbers and
recover the final outcome. After the voting finishes, each
voter and teller should remove from private storage all their
stored vote shares.
Note that given the voting outcome, the adversary can
figure out how the set of all honest voters voted as a whole;
however, assuming that at least one teller is honest, and
the adversary cannot decrypt the communication between
honest voters and the honest teller, even computationally
unbounded adversary cannot learn any additional informa-
tion.
3.3 Verifiable Teller Aggregates
Using only secret sharing does not provide any in-
tegrity/correctness guarantee. Any malicious voter, teller,
or ESP can manipulate vote outcomes. If a teller is malicious,
it can report an incorrect aggregate, e.g., adding or subtract-
ing some number from the reported aggregate. To prevent
this, each voter submits in the ballot cryptographic com-
mitments of all the shares. This ballot is published on the
bulletin board. When a teller publishes the aggregate, it also
needs to publish evidences that the aggregate is indeed that
of the shares in all published ballots.
Informally, a commitment scheme enables a party P to
commit to a value x by computing and publishing z = f (x ,y),
where y is a newly chosen random nonce. P can later “open”
the commitment by revealing x and y. The hiding property
of a commitment scheme requires that one cannot learn the
value x from z, and the binding property requires that P can-
not open the commitment using a pair of values x ′,y ′ such
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that x ′ , x . Both the hiding and binding property can be ei-
ther computational or unconditional (information theoretic).
However, it is impossible to have both unconditional hiding
and unconditional binding (in the normal setting [30]). For
Koinonia, we use the Pedersen commitment scheme [52],
which is given below.
Definition 1 (The Pedersen Commitment Scheme).
Setup A trusted third party chooses a group G of size q, a
generator д of the group G, and a random element h ∈ G
such that logд h is unknown.
Commit The domain of the committed values is Zq . To
commit to a value x ∈ Zq , one chooses a random nonce
y ← Zq and computes the commitment z = д
xhy .
Open To open a commitment z, one reveals x and y, and
anyone can verify that z = дxhy .
The Pedersen commitment scheme is unconditionally hid-
ing: Even with unlimited computational power it is impos-
sible for an adversary to learn any information about the
value x from z. This commitment scheme is computationally
binding: Assuming that Discrete Logarithm is hard, it is com-
putationally infeasible for an adversarial committer to open
z = дxhy using x ′ , x . These two properties together make
the Pedersen commitment scheme well-suited for our needs
of future privacy and current integrity.
The Pedersen commitment scheme has the homomorphic
property. Given n commitments zi = д
xihyi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,












is a commitment of X =
∑




For each vote share xi , the voter Vi randomly chooses
yi , includes the Pedersen commitment zi = д
xihyi in her
ballot βi , and sends both xi and yi to the teller. When the
teller reports an aggregated share X =
∑
i xi , it also reports
Y =
∑
i yi , and the ESP can verify that the aggregate (X ,Y )




Since the Pedersen commitment scheme is information
theoretically hiding, the commitments of the shares leak
no information about the committed value; thus publishing
the ballots does not affect voting privacy against the most
powerful adversaries.
3.4 Proving Ballot Well-formedness
A malicious voter may try to cheat, by voting 2, 3, or more,
instead of 1, for a candidate. Since each teller sees only a
share of a vote, which reveals no information of the vote,
it cannot detect such cheating. To prevent such malicious
voter behavior, we require that each ballot have proofs that
the shares are well-formed. There are several different pos-
sible definitions of well-formedness. Typically, an election
requires that a vote for each candidate is either 1 or 0, that is,
the proof shows that the product of the commitments of all
shares for one candidate can be opened as either 1 or 0. Other
constraints such as “only one candidate among c candidates
can be selected” can also be established using proofs. This
would require a proof that the product of commitments of
vote shares for all candidates can be opened as a commit-
ment of 1. The techniques for doing these two proofs are
standard [26, 35, 52, 58]. We include descriptions for these
two proofs in Appendix B.1 & B.2.
Exactly which kinds of proofs are needed depends on the
actual requirements of a specific election, and is orthogo-
nal to the Koinonia protocol; however, voting privacy re-
quires that such proofs to be witness-indistinguishable [34].
A witness-indistinguishable proof (WIP) is a variant of a
zero-knowledge proof. In a typical zero-knowledge proof
of a statement, the prover will use a witness for the state-
ment as input to the protocol, and the verifier will learn
nothing other than the truth of the statement. In a WIP, this
zero-knowledge condition is weakened, and the guarantee
is that the verifier will not be able to distinguish between
provers that use different witnesses. In particular, the pro-
tocol may leak information about the set of all witnesses.
Unlike zero-knowledge proofs, WIP protocols remain secure
when multiple proofs are being performed concurrently. In
our context, a witness consists of the pair of a vote share x
and and a nonce y such that дxhy = z, and our privacy goal
requires that the proof does not enable one to distinguish
the usage of (x ,y) in the proof versus the usage of x ′,y ′ in





In Koinonia, such well-formedness proofs are included in
the ballots submitted to the ESP, and can be verified by ev-
eryone. This does not affect the everlasting privacy property
of Koinonia, as the proofs used by an election are witness-
indistinguishable, and reveal no information about the vote
shares and the secret nonces.
3.5 Robustness
A tellermay try to obstruct the tallying process by not submit-
ting aggregates, or submitting aggregates that are incorrect.
For example, a malicious party may register as a teller for the
purpose of obstructing the voting process. Such behavior can
be identified. If one desires to ensure that tallying can con-
tinue even in the presence of such tellers, each voter needs to
store the vote shares until the tallying phase finishes. After
a teller is identified as obstructing, the teller’s role needs to
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be replaced by a new teller or by the ESP, and having the
voters send their shares to the new teller.
We note that existing e-voting protocols are also vulnera-
ble to such a DoS attack. If homomorphic encryption is used,
and collaboration of multiple parties is needed to decrypt,
then one or more such parties can decide not to participate
in the protocol for decrypting voting results. This problem is
usually dealt with using threshold cryptography, so that not
allm parties are required to decrypt. So long as the number
of obstructing tellers is below a threshold, decryption can
continue. This, however, also means that the collusion of
fewer thanm parties can compromise vote privacy. In the
case of sharing a decryption key amongm parties, each party
possesses a piece of information that is not known to anyone
else. In our setting, the information possessed by a teller is
held by the voters, enabling the system to recover from an
obstructing teller; thus we choose to maximize privacy as-
surance and uses a simplem-out-of-m secret sharing, instead
of a k-out-of-m secret sharing.
A teller may try to obstruct in a more subtle manner. For
example, it may report an aggregate that does not include
some voters’ shares, and claim to have never received the
shares from the voters. This can be solved as follows. When
a voter submits a vote share x , noncey, and commitment z =
дxhy to a teller, the teller digitally signs ⟨z⟩ after verifying
that z = дxhy . This signature is then included in the ballot.
A ballot is valid only if it has signed acknowledgments for
share commitments. Thus for each share, the ballot needs
to include a commitment of the share as well as a signed
acknowledgment from the teller who receives the share.
If a teller does not provide a signature after receiving
the commitment, then the voter will immediately notice
that the process of submitting her vote is obstructed by the
teller. This needs to be resolved outside the voting protocol.
Obtaining the digital signatures ensures that after the ballot
is submitted, if a teller obstructs, then it can be identified as
obstructing.
3.6 Ballot Legitimacy
Given a list of all published ballots, together with vote share
aggregates from the tellers, everyone can verify that a vote
outcome is consistent with the published ballots. If one de-
fines voting correctness/integrity to mean just that, then this
can be achieved without the need to trust any of the parties
involved in the election. However, for the election result to
be correct, we also need ballot legitimacy, which we define
to mean that each of the published ballot is cast by an eligible
voter, and every ballot cast by an eligible voter is included
in the list.
Defending against the “missing ballot” attack. After
the election closes, the Election Service Provider (ESP), who
controls the bulletin board, publishes the list of all accepted
ballots. Each teller can then find all vote shares that corre-
spond to the commitments in the ballots, and compute their
aggregates. We note that it is possible that a small number
of vote shares are missing, as a voter may have started the
voting process and sent vote shares to some tellers, but did
not complete the voting process. However, if there are a
significant number of vote shares missing from the ballot,
then the teller can detect this. Also, each voter can check
whether her ballot is included in the tallying. Even if not all
voters actually perform the check, the fact that they can and
some of them do, should be sufficient to deter a malicious
ESP from intentionally not including a valid ballot. To be
able to identify whether the ESP is indeed to blame (and not
framed by malicious voters who submit all vote shares but
not the ballot), the voting process should require the ESP
to provide a signed receipt upon accepting a ballot. A voter
can choose to either perform the check herself, or send the
signed receipt to tellers to allow them to pursue the ESP if
her ballot is not included. Disputes regarding ESP obstruct-
ing an election by not issuing a signed receipt for a valid
ballot will be discovered immediately.
Defending against the “ballot stuffing” attack. Ensur-
ing that every published ballot is cast by an eligible voter
is more difficult. As entities such as ESP and EA can easily
play the role of voters and submit vote shares. To ensure this,
some mechanism is needed to authenticate ballots. This is
obviously needed if an election is not open to everyone. Even
if an election is open to everyone, somemechanism is needed
to prevent a voter from voting more than once. Exactly how
voter authentication is done is outside an e-voting protocol.
For example, the default setting of Helios requires the EA
to upload a list of allowed voters and their email addresses.
Then each voter registers with the ESP, proving ownership
of an email address on the list, before she can be allowed
to vote. However, trusting ESP for ballot authenticity seems
unsettling.
Another approach, which removes the trust on ESP, is for
each voter to submit her ballot to the EA, who verifies voter
identity, and then digitally signs the accepted ballot, which is
then published in the bulletin board. In this approach, trust is
shifted from the ESP to the EA. It might appear that trusting
the EA for ballot legitimacy is unavoidable, since after all EA
is the entity to decide the list of legitimate voters. However,
we argue this is not the case. When publishing the list of
eligible voters, cheating behavior by the EA will be detected,
and thus the EA is deterred from doing that. However, if
the EA signs each ballot that is not linked to any voter, this
cannot be detected.
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Another possibility is for the EA to publish a list of voters
together with their public keys (which can be a newly gen-
erated key specific to this voting, to provide pseudonymity).
Each voter then digitally signs her ballot, which is published.
This requires the existence of a public key infrastructure
(PKI) before an election starts.
Without a PKI, trust on ESP and EA can be shifted to
tellers. When the list of eligible voter email addresses is
made public, each teller can also verify ownership of email
addresses and accepts vote shares only from legitimate voters.
If it is required that each voter must send vote shares to all
tellers, then this removes trust in a single entity (ESP), and
replaces it with trust that at least one of the tellers is honest,
which is the same as the trust assumption for privacy.
What if one entity does not want to trust any of ESP, EA,
and tellers, for voting integrity/correctness? This is achiev-
able under the following conditions. First, the list of eligible
voters is public. Second, each ballot can be linked to one
voter, which can be contacted. Third, each voter can identify
one’s own ballot. To verify voting correctness, one can ran-
domly select a number of ballots in the published list, extract
the voter identities of them, and contact each one to confirm
that the published ballot on the list is indeed hers. Note that
this does not reveal how a voter voted, because the ballot
contains only commitments of shares.
4 THE PROTOCOL IN Koinonia
We now describe the protocol in Koinonia.
4.1 The Setup Phase
System Parameter Generation. The setup algorithm is
executed by the ESP and takes a security parameter λ as
input.
Setup(λ) = ⟨G,q,д,h⟩ , (1)
where G is a group consisting of q elements where discrete
logarithm is hard, д is a generator of G, and h is an element
of the group such that no party knows logд h. In our current
implementation, G,q,д are determined by choosing a stan-
dard Elliptic curve, and h is computed by hashing the string
“Koinonia”.
Voter Registration. The EA publishes election information
and the list of eligible voters. Let n be the total number of all
registered voters, the EA publishes:
⟨V1, · · · ,Vn⟩ . (2)
Tabulation Teller Registration. The EA publishes t Tab-
ulation Tellers, and publishes their network addresses and
public keys. 〈
T 1,PK1; · · · ;T t ,PKt
〉
. (3)
4.2 The Voting Phase
As shown in Fig. 3, the voting phase involves voters, tellers,
and the ESP. For simplicity we focus on the interactions as
seen by a particular voter, Vi , involving only an arbitrary
teller, T k .
Commitment Generation. Let c be the number of candi-
dates, and vi, j ∈ {0, 1} be Vi ’s vote for candidate j. Voter Vi
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In this matrix, the j’th row includes commitments for all
shares of Vi ’s votes for candidate j, and the k’th column
includes commitments of shares to be sent to teller T k .
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can be established because T k ’s public key is published and
known to all voters.
The teller T k verifies that the commitments in Zki are


















i , and sends a
digital signature of Zki to Vi . Let σ
k
i denote these signatures.
Constructing Well-formedness Proofs. Vi then con-
structs a proof Π that the commitments are well-formed.
As discussed in Section 3.4, what to prove depends on the
requirements of an election. For example, if the requirement
is that the vote for each candidate should be either 0 or 1,
and that Vi must vote for one and only one candidate, i.e.,∑c
j=1vi, j = 1, then Π consists of the following two kinds of
proofs:
∀j ∈[1..c] πi, j
where πi, j is a proof that the product of the j’th row
inMi is a Pedersen commitment of either 0 or 1
(see Appendix B.2 for details about πi, j )
(7)




❶ Split votes into shares (eq. 4)
❷ Compute commitment
matrix Mi (eq. 5) ❸ The k ’th column of Mi (Zki )
| | secret shares (X ki ) | | nonces (Y
k
i )
❹ Verify commitment Zki
with X ki and Y
k
i (eq. 6)
❺ Digital signature of Zki (σ
k
i )
❻ Construct proof of
well-formedness Π
(e.g., eq. 7 & 8)
❼ Ballot βi =
(





❽ Verify βi is
well-formed
❾ Signed receipt (digital signature of βi )
❿ Signed receipt







where πi,0 is a proof that the product of all
elements inMi is a Pedersen commitment of 1
(see Appendix B.1 for details about πi,0)
(8)







This proves that a voter’s vote for all candidates sums up
to 1. Combining this with the condition that each vote for
every candidate is either 0 or 1, we can prove that any vote
is for one and only one candidate.
In our implementation of Koinonia, by default we assume
that the election allows null votes, that is, a voter can choose
not to support any candidates. In that case, Koinonia only
needs to support the proofs described by eq. (7).










Submitting Ballot. Vi submits to the ESP her ballot βi . The
ESP runs Verifyβ , which verifies that βi iswell-formed, i.e.,
the voter is a valid voter, the signatures from the tellers are
valid, and the proofs are valid. Then the ESP publishes via
the bulletin board βi , and also signs βi and sends to Vi the
signature as a signed receipt. Vi sends the signed receipt to
all tellers.
4.3 Tallying and Verification
The tallying phase begins after the completion of the vot-
ing phase. As shown in Fig. 4, it mainly involves the ESP
and tellers. Results can be fetched and verified through the
bulletin board provided by the ESP.
Publishing Ballots. The ESP publishes the final list of all
accepted ballots.
B = ⟨βi , for i ∈ I+⟩ . (10)
Where I+ denotes all i’s such that Voter Vi ’s ballot βi is
included in the list of accepted ballots.
The Aggregate function. Each teller T k first checks that
any ballot for which it has received a signed receipt is in-
cluded in I+. If not, it reports that the ESP is trying to exclude
ballots and produces the signed receipt as an evidence.
Each tellerT k then computes the sum of the random shares
included in βi ’s for i ∈ I+〈(
X k∗, j =
∑
i ∈I+





yki, j mod q
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T k sends (X k
∗, j ,Y
k
∗, j ) and its digital signature, signed by
T k ’s private key, to the ESP, who accepts it after verifying
that




The ESP, after having accepted (X k
∗, j ,Y
k




∗, j from all T
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’s and digitally signs them.




X k∗, j Y∗, j =
∑
k
Y k∗, j (13)
Verification (the TallyVerify function). Each voter can
verify that her ballot is included in the list of accepted ballots.
Furthermore, even if a voter does not perform the check, so
long as the voter follows the protocol and distributes the
acknowledgment to all tellers, and at least one honest teller
follows the protocol and checks that the ballot is included,
omission of the ballot can be detected. Anyone can run the
following TallyVerify procedure using the published ballots
and aggregates as input.






❶ All of the accepted
ballots (eq. 10)
❹ Xk∗, j and Y
k
∗, j from
all tellers (eq. 12)
❺ Final outcome
X∗, j and Y∗, j (eq. 13)
❷ ESP
excluded ballots?






Figure 4: The Tallying Phase of Koinonia
• Check that the proof Π in each ballot βi is correct.
• Computes the final outcome (see eq. (13) above)
• Check that the final outcome for each candidate j ,X∗, j and
Y∗, j satisfies the following condition:






• If any of the above checks fail, outputs ⊥.
4.4 Complexity of Koinonia
We analyze computational complexity for a voter, and for the
cost of verifying an election. We count the number of group
exponentiations since its cost dominates other computations.
Let c be the number candidates and t be the number of tellers.
In the ballot generation, a voter computes ct commitments
(eq. (5)), each of which requires 2 exponentiations. It also
needs to generate c proofs (eq. (7)) that a committed value
is either 0 or 1, each of which requires 3 exponentiations
(eq. (17) in Appendix B), and one additional proof on the
sum of all c votes. In our implementation, a voter can cast
null votes, so we need another proof of 0 or 1, and hence
2ct + 3c + 3 exponentiations in total. Alternatively, if the
election requires exactly one candidate to be chosen, then
the additional proof is a commitment of 1, which requires
only 1 exponentiation (eq. (16) in Appendix B). Thus, in total,
creating a ballot takes 2ct + 3c + 1 exponentiations.
To verify a proof that a committed value is either 0 or 1
takes 4 exponentiations, and verifying a proof that a com-
mitted value is 1 takes 2 exponentiations (eq. (18) and eq.
(16) in Appendix B, respectively). Hence verifying proofs in
a ballot needs 4c + 4 exponentiations if voters are allowed
to cast null votes, or 4c + 2 exponentiations if the election
requires each voter to choose exactly one candidate. Note
that the cost of verifying the aggregate shares published by
tellers are correct, when amortized over each ballot, is small




In this section, we describe our implementation of Koinonia.
We first show how it provides the capability of setting up
elections on servers (ESP, EA, and Tellers) and handling votes
from clients (Voters). We also discuss howwe provide flexibly
configurable secure communication channels as well as its
implications on privacy.
5.1 System Components
The Koinonia system is written in Node.js. ESP, EA, and
Tellers are independent server-side applications recom-
mended to be running on different machines. Clients will get
the Voter application from the Authority and execute it on a
Web browser. We use PostgreSQL on ESP, EA, and Tellers
as the database back-end for storing election data.
Koinonia Libraries. In Koinonia, ESP, EA, Tellers, and Vot-
ers share similar needs for protocol functions such as vote
share generation and proof verification. We thus built two
libraries, one for server-side and the other for client-side.
WebCryptoAPI [65] is a standard JavaScript API for per-
forming cryptographic operations in web applications. Al-
though WebCryptoAPI has already been supported by major
browser vendors, at the time of writing, it has a limited
number of cryptographic algorithms available, and does not
natively support expensive big integer operations such as
modular exponentiation. For ease of deployment, we imple-
mented a Koinonia library for Voter that is based on SJCL
[37, 62] and can run on typical web browsers, adding 500+
lines of JavaScript code.
Since cryptographic operations such as group exponentia-
tion are computationally expensive, we implemented some of
these functionally with native code as optimization for ESP,
EA and Tellers, as server-side applications allow a more flex-
ible deployment. Through Node.js C++ Addons, we added
1200+ lines of C++ code for wrapping around and routing
many cryptographic operations to OpenSSL for significantly
better performance. It initializes (eq.1) with an EC (Elliptic
Curve) scheme, which fixes the group G and generator д,
and a random EC point h = (x ,y) ∈ G generated based on
the digest of a common string (x ).
PKOV. Public Key Ownership Verification (PKOV) is a
challenge-response protocol to show the server owning the
public key under computational security. The client sends
a pseudo-random messagem to the server. The server com-
putes the digest d (using SHA-256) of the concatenation of
a prefix string “PKOV”, the messagem, and a 256-bit pseudo-
random salt encoded in Base64. Then, the server signs the
digestd with its private key. The server returns the signature,
salt, and public key. The client accepts the public key if the
signature verification is correct.
We run the PKOV protocol to retrieve the public key from
a remote server during the election setup phase (Section 4.1).
The PKOV protocol allows the server to choose asymmetric
keys independent from the X.509 certificates used in HTTPS,
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and allow one to experiment with new public-key crypto
that is not yet widely deployed in common browsers.
ESP. The ESP is a web server providing the software and
platform. One ESP may serve many EAs, who run different
elections. The ESP provides a Bulletin Board to accept the
well-formed ballot βi and return the digital signature to the
voter (see Fig. 3). The ESP is the only public channel to
broadcast the accepted ballots and the election final result.
EA. The EA is a web server which allows the election admin-
istrator to control the progress of an election. The election
administrator can use a browser to register an EA server on
the ESP to obtain an unique election ID for the newly created
election through the website hosted by the ESP. The ESP re-
trieves the public key of the EA using the PKOV protocol
before returning the election ID. The administrator creates
an election and registers teller servers that are to be used in
the newly created election on the EA with the election ID. It
is recommended that the administrator use only an internal
network to connect to the EA for the creation/administration
of elections.
In our current implementation, we use voters’ email ad-
dress and a 256-bit randomly generated voter ID to represent
their identity. The administrator publishes the election in-
formation (election positions & candidates), the list of valid
voter identities, and the list of teller servers with public keys.
The EA signs all published information before the election
opens. After an election is opened, the administrator sends
from the EA a voting link to voters through emails. Each
voting link contains the election ID, voter identity, and as-
sociated link digital signature. The digital signature in the
voting link is a secret to authenticate the voter submitting
the share and commitment to Tellers and the ballot to the
ESP.
Tellers. Each Teller T k is a web server that accepts and
verifies (eq. 6) a vote share (X ki ,Y
k
i ) and the associated com-
mitment (Zki , represented as an EC point) submitted by a
voter Vi . The teller signs Z
k
i with its private key and sends





crypted using AES-CBC before storing in the database. The
encryption key is derived using PBKDF2 (Password-Based
Key Derivation Function 2) [42] from a startup password cho-
sen by the server administrator. We recommend the Teller
server administrator to be different from the election ad-
ministrator, the EA server administrator, and the ESP server
administrator.
In order for a Teller to serve an election, it has to be reg-
istered by the election administrator at the EA before the
election opens. The registration sends the election infor-
mation to the Teller server and retrieves the public key of
the Teller server by running the PKOV protocol. The Teller
server should retrieve the public key of the ESP and the EA
by running the PKOV protocol before returning its public
key to the EA.
Client. The voter uses the link received from the email to
access the voting page provided by the ESP. The voter selects
a candidate for each position and submits the vote.
On the client side (voter), the in-browser JavaScript gen-
erates the shares (eq. 4) and associated commitments (eq. 5)
for each Teller and sends the vote shares and commitments
to the Tellers via HTTP(S) requests. After receiving and ver-
ifying the signatures from all Tellers, the in-browser script
constructs proof of well-formedness Π (eq. 7) and send the
ballot βi (eq. 9) to the ESP. Note that NULL vote is accepted
so that πi,0 becomes a proof that a value of a commitment
of either 0 or 1. The in-browser script verifies signed re-
ceipt from the ESP and sends the receipt to one of the Teller
servers.
The in-browser script can be hosted either by a trusted
third party or by the ESP. The voter can run an offline script
to verify the ballot after the election closes.
System Parameters and Tuning. Our Koinonia imple-
mentation provides configuration flexibility, by allowing the
users to select appropriate security parameters to match their
specific concerns and security requirements. The system is
pre-configured with a default setting that is considered to
be reasonable under the computational power possessed by
future adversaries.
The ESP server administrator chooses the parameter λ
to initialize the Koinonia Library (eq. 1). We choose curve
secp256r1 [55], digest algorithm SHA-256, and “Koinonia” as
the common string in the experiment. The server adminis-
trator (ESP, EA, and Tellers) can use OpenSSL to generate a
private key which is recommended to be encrypted under a
key derived from a chosen server startup password. In the
experiment, we use EC key pairs with curve
Secure Communication and Long-term Privacy. Al-
though the commitment scheme used inKoinonia is designed
to be information theoretically hiding, however, if the com-
munications between voters and the ESP, EA, and Tellers is
being eavesdropped by a powerful ⟨дlobal , f uture⟩ adver-
sary, privacy can still be endangered. Thus, we use stunnel
to provide secure communication channels between com-
ponents. Stunnel provides a means of incorporating experi-
mental algorithms that are not standardized into typical web
browsers yet.
Specifically, with concerns about the possibility of a pas-
sive adversary monitoring enough of the current traffic and
try to break them in the future with advanced algorithms
or even quantum computers, we have incorporated Open
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Table 1: running time of Koinonia library based on an
election with one position (e.g. president), two candi-
dates, and three Tellers
Koinonia Library based on SJCL (sample size 30)
Voter
1. Generate MatrixMi (eq. 5) 146ms ± 8.1%
2. Generate Proof Π (eq. 7) 109ms ± 3.4%
3. Verify the Signature σki from the Teller T
k
11.9ms ± 30%
4. Verify the Signature from the ESP 9.31ms ± 10%
5. Total Time (1+2+3×t (Number of Tellers) +4) 301ms ± 4.9%
Koinonia Library based on Node.js C++ Addons (sample size 10,000)
Teller
1. Verify Commitments Zki (eq. 6) 1.01ms ± 35%
2. Total Time for Accepting Zki 2.37ms ± 22%
(1 + Encrypt X ki ,Y
k
i + Sign Z
k
i + Verify the Sig-
nature of the Voter Identity)
ESP
1. Verify the Proof Π in the ballot βi 2.78ms ± 26%
2. Total Time for Accepting βi 5.77ms ± 27%
(1 +∀k , Verifyσki + Sign βi +Verify the Signature
of the Voter Identity)
Verifier
1. Verify Eq. 14 and the Proof Π in 10,000 Ballots
(run in 8 Threads)
6.7s
2. Total Time for the Verification (run in 8
Threads)
11s
(1 + ∀i,∀k , Verify σki + ∀i , Verify the Signature
of the Voter Identity)
Quantum Safe (OQS)
3
with stunnel to offer the possibility
of performing quantum-safe key exchange for the establish-
ment of TLS connections. Other known key exchange algo-
rithms, as supported by OpenSSL, can also be used. Like other
system parameters, the exact ciphersuite to be used for the
TLS connections can be configured by the users to address
their specific concerns. Users are free to choose classical key
exchange algorithms in favor of their maturity over the new
quantum-safe ones. An evaluation of the merits between
different algorithms is beyond the scope of this paper.
Since TLS is meant to provide end-to-end security, for
usability sake, we have implemented a client-side provision-
ing proxy for setting up the various TLS tunnels automati-
cally and multiplexing HTTP requests to the ESP and Tellers
through the correct tunnel.
5.2 Election Tallying and Verification
Share Publishing. After Admin closes the election, a list
of valid ballots are published on the ESP, the bulletin board.
On each Teller T k , the server administrator runs an offline
script to discover the shares stored on the teller server by
using the 256-bit voter ID and the teller signature σki . The
script decrypts the X ki ,Y
k
i from the filtered out shares and
computes (eq. 11). The script also checks that any ballot for































Figure 5: The Running Time of Koinonia Verification
With One Position (e.g. President) and Three Tellers.
Solid line shows the running time of verifying the
proof Π (Esq. 7 and (eq. 14). Dashed line shows the
running time taken by the solid line add with verifi-
cation time of the signature of the voter Identity and
σki signed by TellerT
k . X ,Y axes are represented in log
scale.
published ballots. The teller deletes the share after finishing
the summation. After that, the script submits the summation
result X k
Û, j , Y
k
Û, j and its digital signature, signed byT
k
’s private
key, to the ESP.
Final Publishing. The ESP server administrator runs an
offline script which first verifies the signature of the summa-
tion results X k
Û, j , Y
k
Û, j and checks their correctness (eq. 12). The
script reports Tellers which try to submit incorrect results
and produces the signed result as evidence.




Û, j and YÛ, j =∑
k Y
k
Û, j in the database, which will be immediately published
through the ESP website.
Verification. The verification program is implemented ac-
cording to Section 4.3. It is an offline script which can be
run by any third parties (e.g. voter or teller). The verification
program also provides an optional verification of the signa-
ture σki of the commitment Z
k
i (signed by Teller T
k
) and the
voter identity (signed by EA) for each ballot.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
We present the running time of Koinonia Library in Table
1 and show that the computation cost of our implementa-
tion is small, and the system can be deployed on commodity
machine
4
. In terms of storage cost, for an election with one
position (e.g. president), two candidates, and three Tellers,
the size of each ballot is roughly 2.6KB (kilobyte). This in-
creases linearly depending on the number of candidates and
4
The experiment runs on the machine with Intel Core i7-3770 3.40 GHz CPU
and 16 GB RAM, running Node.js v8.4.0, OpenSSL 1.1.0f, and PostgreSQL
v9.6.4.
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the number of Teller servers. Regarding total execution time,
the voter needs around 300 milliseconds to compute. Both
Teller and ESP servers can verify the voter’s submission
within about 5 milliseconds. It takes around 11 seconds to
verify the correctness of an election with 10,000 ballots (12
group exponentiations per ballot with 2 candidates).
We also measure the running time of the verification pro-
gram using simulation, with elections having one position
and three Tellers, 2 to 12 candidates, and 10,000 to 1 million
ballots (see Fig. 5). The verification time increases linearly
with the number of candidates and voters. Notice that the
verification of ballots is easily parallelizable. The verification
program running in 8 threads can verify the correctness of
an election given 1 million ballots, each containing 12 candi-
dates, within 1 hour. The optional verification of signature
σki (dashed line) adds a small overhead, depending on the
number of Tellers, on the original verification process (solid
line).
6 RELATEDWORK
In recent years, Internet-based voting has been utilized
in governmental elections around the world such as Esto-
nia [23, 24], New South Wales, Australia [13], Norway [38],
Switzerland [15], and Utah, USA [8]. Unfortunately, due to
the strict and conflicting requirements in voting [20], none
of the existing voting systems adequately addressed all the
challenges in e-voting [9, 36, 61]. Most of these systems focus
primarily on integrity and have not considered long-term
privacy as their main concerns.
E-voting protocols typically utilize the following crypto-
graphic techniques: mix-net [1, 3, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22, 29, 41, 45,
56, 57, 63, 66], homomorphic encryption [2, 4, 25, 27, 28, 40,
43, 47], blind signature [12, 17, 44, 51, 54] and secret shar-
ing based on polynomials [6, 7, 27, 59] or simple (n,n) secret
sharing [68]. Despite numerous previous work on everlasting
voting privacy [10, 11, 27, 32, 33, 46–50, 64], we note that the
adversary models under which these schemes can achieve
privacy could be different. For example, some systems re-
quire complex and contrasting assumptions in order to de-
liver privacy protections [5, 29]. Other attempts at achieving
everlasting privacy include [64] which combines ideas from
Punchscan [53] with Prêt à Voter [56], [32] which combines
Prêt à Voter [56] with unconditional hiding commitments,
and [46] which relies on membership proofs. Moran et al.
proposed an everlastingly private voting scheme [48] for
direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems, as well as
split-ballot voting [49, 50] for a conventional “voting booth”
setup.
Demirel et al. aimed to improve Helios [1] with everlast-
ing privacy [33], where each individual vote is encrypted
with the Paillier cryptosystem, and the tally correctness is
guaranteed by Pedersen commitments. However, under the
⟨дlobal , f uture⟩ and ⟨local ,unbounded⟩ adversary models,
this design suffers from the same problem of today’s en-
crypted information stored by the adversary might be used
to reconstruct plain votes in the future (e.g., when the de-
cisional composite residuosity assumption that the Paillier
cryptosystem relies on no longer holds).
Some protocols try to incorporate quantum-safe crypto
in e-voting. One such effort is EVOLVE [31]. EVOLVE
shares some similarities with Koinonia as it also uses a
simple (n,n)-secret sharing. However, EVOLVE relies on
a lattice-based homomorphic commitment scheme. Differ-
ent from Koinonia which uses Pedersen commitment and
is information-theoretically hiding, the lattice-based com-
mitment in EVOLVE, which is based on the (assumption of
the) hardness of M-SIS and M-LWE, is both computation-
ally hiding and computationally binding [31], and hence the
privacy guarantee is not as strong as that of Koinonia, espe-
cially in the face of ⟨дlobal , f uture⟩ and ⟨local ,unbounded⟩
adversaries.
The protocol closest in spirit to Koinonia is that by
Cramer et al. [27]. It uses Pedersen’s Verifiable Secret Shar-
ing scheme [52], which combines Pedersen commitment
with Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [60]. Instead of using
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, we show that a simple addi-
tive secret sharing scheme, which is easier to comprehend
and implement, is sufficient for our privacy needs. We also
discuss the security considerations regarding communica-
tions among the entities in different adversary models.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the problem achieving strong
long-term privacy guarantees in e-voting protocols. We clas-
sify adversaries along two dimensions: local and global in
terms of what the adversary sees, and current, future, and
unbounded in terms of their computational ability. We argue
that voting protocols based on secret sharing offer a more
natural and elegant privacy-preserving solution than their
encryption-based counterparts. Motivated by the “current
integrity; future privacy” principle, we analyze the threats
posed by future adversaries to voting privacy today, and de-
sign and implement Koinonia, which combines a simple but
information theoretic hiding additive secret sharing scheme
with Perdersen commitments to achieve long-term privacy
and correctness guarantees. We also experimented ways of
using quantum-safe key exchange algorithms in protecting
the communication channels used by the entities in the pro-
tocol. Koinonia requires only modest computational costs to
operate. We consider handling other issues of e-voting like
voter coercion and vote selling as possible future work.
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B.1 A Commitment of 1
To prove that a value z is a commitment of 1, i.e., one knows
y such that z = д1hy , one needs to prove the knowledge of
the discrete log of д−1z. This is a standard protocol, which is
obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to the Schnorr
protocol of knowledge of discrete logarithm.
To prove that one knows y such that z = д1hy , let H be
a one-way hash function, one randomly chooses r ←r Zq ,
computes d = hr , e = H (z,d), f = ((r − ey)mod q) and
publishes (d, f ). We write this as publishing
(d, f ) : r ←r Zq , d ← h
r , e ← H (z,d),
f ← ((r − ey) mod q)
(15)






In the proof, the value e is the challenge. When running
in the interactive setting, the value e is generated by the
verifier. The protocol does not reveal the value y because
if the challenge e is generated first, then one can choose a
random f and then compute d that will satisfy the check (16),
without knowing the value y. When the prover follows the






= hf +ey = h((r−ey) mod q)+ye = hr = d
Why this proves knowing y. The value e is an unpre-
dictable challenge, since it is the result of a one-way hash
function. Suppose that after one decides on d , one is able to









Then we know that
h(f1−f2)(e2−e1)
−1
mod q = zд−1
That is, one recovers y = (f1 − f2)(e1 − e2)
−1
mod q such that
z = д1hy .
B.2 A Commitment of either 0 or 1
To prove that a value z is a commitment of either 0 or 1,
we need to prove that one knows y such that д−bz = hy ,
without revealing y. We now give a non-interactive version
of the proof, which was given in [27]. Let
¯b denotes 1 − b.
The basic idea is that one conducts in parallel two proofs, for
knowing the discrete log of д−bz and д−
¯bz. Since one knows
only that ofд−bz, one has to cheat for the proof forд−
¯bz. One
does this by choosing the challenge e ¯b and then responding
to challenge eb , which is derived based on e and e ¯b . More
specifically, one publishes
(d0,d1, e0, e1, f0, f1) : r ←r Zq , e ¯b←r Zq , f ¯b ←r Zq ,
db ← h
r , d ¯b ← h
f ¯b (д−
¯bz)e ¯b ,
e ← H (z,d0,d1),
eb ← ((e − e ¯b ) mod q),
fb ← ((r − eby) mod q)
(17)
To verify the proof, one checks the following












When the prover follows the protocol, we note that e = eb +e ¯b











= hr−eby (hy )eb = hr = db
